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Increasing land use and associated competition for natural resources in the wake of high human and livestock
population pressures have been major challenges confronting pastoralists of West Africa. This is especially true in
Nigeria where Fulani make up 4% of the national population and prevailing national insecurity issues are impacting
on pastoral livelihoods, including violent conflicts over land and ethnic, religious and political disparities.
This study examined the dynamics of immigration within the Kachia Grazing Reserve (KGR), an exclusively Fulani
pastoralist community in Kaduna State, northwest Nigeria, prompted by concerns from both the farming communities
and the authorities about mounting pressure on existing limited resources, particularly in regard to availability of cattle
grazing resources.
Drawing from a household census conducted in 2011 and employing a range of qualitative methods (focus group
discussions and key informant interviews), this study explored the drivers and consequences of immigration and
subsequent integration within the KGR community.
The study revealed two types of immigration: a steady trickle of pastoralists migrating to the reserve to settle and
acquire land, secure from the stresses of competition from cultivators, and the sudden influx of internally displaced
persons fleeing violent clashes in their areas of origin.
Population pressure within the reserve has risen steadily over the past three decades, such that it is severely overgrazed
(as evidenced by reports from the KGR community that the animals run short of pasture even during the wet season
due to desertification and the spread of non-edible weeds). The newer immigrants, fleeing conflict, tended to arrive in
the reserve with significantly larger herds than those kept by established residents. Pastoralists in the reserve have been
forced back into the practice of seasonal transhumance in both wet and dry seasons to support their herds, with all the
attendant risks of theft, clashes with cultivators and increased disease transmission.
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Fulani pastoralists are widely distributed across West
Africa and represent the largest migratory ethnic
group in the world. The origin of the Fulani is obscure
(Ibrahim 1966). The genetic and linguistic evidence
points to a West African origin in Senegambia (Scheinfeld
et al. 2010, Cruciani et al. 2010, Winters 2010; Cerny et al.
2006, Tishkoff et al. 2009). It is suggested that they moved
eastwards in search of pasture for their cattle, passing
through Messina and the Hausa states towards Chad,
eventually reaching Sudan (Blench 1994). Stenning (1957)
reports that their spread through gradual migratory drift
over many centuries was interspersed with periods of in-
tense migration associated with Islamic holy wars (jihad).
Nigeria has a long history of pastoralism. The Fulani
are thought to have reached Nigeria (Hausaland) in the
thirteenth century, by which time they had embraced
Islam (Ibrahim 1966). By the fifteenth century, some
Fulani had largely abandoned herding and settled to be-
come scholars and counsellors in the courts of the
Hausa rulers (Waters-Bayer and Bayer 1994). The rest
maintained seasonal migration with their herds, relying
on the ‘settled’ elite Fulani to ensure right of passage
and access to pasture. In the nineteenth century,
Usman Dan Fodio led a jihad against the Hausa rulers,
securing his Fulani leadership and supremacy in much
of northern Nigeria. At this point, the tribe divided into
the Fulani elite who intermarried with the Hausas and
the ‘cattle Fulani’ or Bororo who continued with their
pastoral life (Ibrahim 1966).
Fulani account for 4% of the national population of
Nigeria (World Atlas 2017). Fulani pastoralists still dom-
inate cattle production in Nigeria, mostly as transhu-
mant agro-pastoralists practicing seasonal movements of
cattle from a permanent base (Azuwike and Enwerem
2010; Iyayi et al. 2003; Blench 2001). The Fulani in
Nigeria include the following: settled Fulani (many of
whom are descendants of the aristocratic elite of what
was previously known as Hausaland), semi-sedentary
Fulani (often agro-pastoralists) and a minority group of
nomadic pastoral Fulani subsisting entirely off their
herds.
Large populations of pastoralists are gradually emi-
grating from their prior grazing grounds in the north of
Nigeria. Changes in land use, expansion of agricultural
activities, population growth, climate change and
desertification have progressively pushed pastoralists
south as the savannahs become less favourable environ-
ments for both farmers and pastoralists (Blench 1996;
Roma 2008; Mwiturubani and van Wyk 2010, Young
and Goldman 2015). Pastoralists are also pulled south
by adaptive features such as the establishment of social
networks, herding contracts, dairy development and cattle
cross-breeding programmes (Bassett and Turner 2007) -for example, the public-private Dairy Development
Programme of Oyo State, https://www.frieslandcampina.
com.ng/sustainability/dairy-development/).
Pastoralists often relocate voluntarily, attracted by
abundant natural resources, greater security, reduced
population pressure, and better opportunities of educa-
tion for their children and trade. Nigeria accounts for
50% of the beef consumed in West Africa with con-
sumption estimated at 433 thousand tonnes in 2015
(https://data.oecd.org/agroutput/meat-consumption.htm).
Demand is mostly concentrated in affluent and populous
southern cities such as Lagos, Ibadan and Port Harcourt
where most large cattle markets and abattoirs are situated
(Bénard et al. 2010). The cattle markets of southern
Nigeria are no longer simply places where cattle exchange
hands. The lands surrounding these trading hubs have
now turned into major grazing bases and havens pro-
tecting pastoralists from irate crop farmers in the
north (Azuwike and Enwerem 2010).
There has been a steady incursion of pastoralists into
the humid and sub-humid zones of Nigeria over at least
the past five decades (Bourn et al. 2001). Clashes be-
tween herders and farmers are often as a result of the
destruction of crops in cultivated farmlands by cattle,
obstruction of traditional migration routes and livestock
theft. There is mutual distrust, and each group blames
the authorities for favouring the other side. For example,
the plan presented in January 2016 to the Nigerian
Governors Forum by the government to map grazing
areas in all states as a temporary solution for cattle
owners was vehemently opposed by most central and
southern states who viewed it as favouring Fulani
herders. To mollify this opposition, a bill was sent to the
National Assembly by the Agriculture Minister in March
2016 to prohibit cattle from roaming in cities and vil-
lages, a decision very badly received by the Fulani com-
munity (International Crisis Group 2017).
Both sides, however, have their share of the blame in
instigating violence, murders and damage to property or
resources. For example, Bukar (2016) investigating man-
agement between farmers and pastoralists in Borno State
found that farmers reported a lot of negative stories of
migrant pastoralists deliberately allowing animals into
cultivated fields, careless cutting of trees and violent be-
haviour when confronted. Baidoo (2014) in his case study
of Fulani herders and farmers in the Ashanti region
(Ghana) reported that spraying of farmland with pesti-
cides, cultivating crops close to kraals and river banks
where cattle go to drink water, encroachment upon graz-
ing routes and shooting of cattle that stray onto farmland
was seen by Fulani herdsmen as a deliberate attempt to
kill their cattle and reduce their access to grazing pasture.
Raping of women by Fulani herdsmen was also a notable
cause of the strained relationship (Baidoo 2014).
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curity in more volatile areas to go to locations where
political tension and violence are less rife. This is in con-
trast to sedentary agriculturalists, who have more to lose
(i.e. land) by relocating.
Transhumant and nomadic pastoral Fulani would
argue that their interests with regard to land rights and
rights of passage during transhumance are largely
neglected by the state and this has led to frustration and
conflict (Blench et al. 2006).
This study explored the drivers and consequences of
immigration into the Kachia Grazing Reserve (KGR),
Kaduna State, and subsequent integration within the
KGR community.
Farmer-herder relations in Nigeria
A symbiotic relationship has traditionally existed between
pastoralists, crop farmers and their environment in
Nigeria. The vegetation zones of Nigeria from north to
south include (1) Sahel (dry zone - camels and goats), (2)
Sudan savannah (lighter woodland), (3) Guinea savannah
(a heavier type of woodland), (4) tropical rain forest or
Guinea forest (thick climax vegetation) and (5) mangrove
swamp (Akinyele 2009; Stenning 1957). Pastoralists prac-
tised dry season migration, moving to the southern
(Guinea savannah) parts of the savannah zone to take ad-
vantage of better pasture there in the dry season.
Pastoralists’ cattle in the past could graze freely on vast
and safe rangelands, reducing opportunities for their
cattle to stray and graze on farmland. During the wet
season, pastoralists returned to the northern savannah
(Sudan savannah and semi-arid zone) to avoid the risk
of tsetse - transmitted African animal trypanosomiasis.
The symbiotic relationship between farmers and herders in
the post-harvest period essentially consisted of cattle bene-
fitting from crop residues in harvested fields and farmers
deriving manure from dung deposited on their fields.
There were trade opportunities as pastoralists purchased
grain from crop farmers and crop farmers bought milk
products from Fulani women. Even though pastoralists did
not own land, they were welcome and encouraged to set
up camp adjacent to farming communities who valued
these opportunities (Stenning 1957; Blench 2003).
In the contemporary period, this symbiosis has been
disrupted by increasing human and livestock popula-
tions, agricultural expansion, the introduction of inor-
ganic fertiliser, the shift to fertiliser-based crops that
produce no useful cattle residues (potato and maize),
widespread availability of powdered milk and reduced
demand for fresh milk. Farmers no longer require the
traditional services of the Fulani pastoralists, but the
Fulani pastoralists are still dependent on their good-
will for access to natural resources (Waters-Bayer and
Bayer 1994; Blench 2004).In the previous era of mutual dependency and abun-
dance of resources, conflict between farmers and pasto-
ralists occurred only during critical periods in the
production calendar (sowing and harvesting). The rela-
tionship between different resource users was, for the
most part, one of complementarity and peaceful co-
existence. Scarcity of resources on which both farmers
and herders depend has eroded this equilibrium and in-
creased the likelihood for conflict of interest and compe-
tition. The effects of this scarcity have been distributed
asymmetrically between farmers and pastoralists. Based
on their status in the broader political context of Nigeria,
some argue that pastoralists in the contemporary period
have been denied access to resources and increasingly
marginalised through landlessness and political powerless-
ness. Pastoralists therefore bear a larger burden of the
scarcity than their rival group, the farmers, as a result of a
gradual shift of power in favour of agriculturalists
(Shettima and Tar 2008).
Insecurity in and around Kaduna State
Independent Nigeria had enjoyed a period of relative
peace until the two coups d’état in 1966 that ushered in
military rule and civil war. The ensuing crises were a fu-
sion of political, ethnic and religious disaffection and
etched the pattern of future conflicts in Nigeria. The
succession of military and civilian regimes that governed
Nigeria until the late 1990s resulted in frequent coups
and conflicts among ethnic and religious factions vying
for supremacy. World Bank directives for the introduc-
tion of structural adjustment programmes in 1986 had
severe and lasting negative effects on the economy
(Babawale 2007). Many factories closed and industrial
employment fell from 335,000 in 1985 to 27,000 in the
1990s with 49% of the population living below the poverty
line (Babawale 2007). The incidence of long-lasting violent
conflicts under military governance was low, due to the
highly centralised governance and the swift crackdown on
any such clashes by the army.
When Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999,
several factors including decentralisation, the emphasis
on indigeneity and local representation in governance
and the rise of religious fundamentalism created the op-
portunities for violent tribal and religious conflicts. The
northwest and north-central regions, with their high ethnic
and religious diversity, have borne a large share of the
violence (Nwozor 2014; UN 2009; NWGAV and AOAV
2015). The increase in rural inequalities between rich and
poor/landless farmers and between rich ranchers and poor
cattle owners, together with intense competition for scarce
resources of land between these groups, has been a major
cause of conflict in rural Nigeria. Outbreaks of violent con-
flict in and around Kaduna State have become common-
place since the return to democratic rule in Nigeria. Major
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of 2011; the Jos crises of 2001, 2004, 2008 and 2010; the
Yelwa-Shendam crisis, 2004; the Kano reprisals for the
Yelwa-Shendam crisis, 2004; the Kaduna Sharia and Miss
World riots, 2000 to 2002; religious riots in Kano, 2004;
and Sunni-Shia clashes in Sokoto, 2005, 2007 and 2010,
and there have been long-running inter-communal clashes
in Gwer-West, Benue State and Riyom/Barkin Ladi,
Plateau State and southern Kaduna State (HRW 2005;
NWGAV and AOAV 2015). Many of these conflicts
were essentially spawned by competition for resources
(e.g. land, cattle, education and lucrative political and
professional positions) and exacerbated by a complex
interplay of religion, ethnicity, politics and socio-
economic disparities.
Rural conflicts have tended to focus on access to nat-
ural resource while urban conflicts have tended to be
triggered by differences in ethnicity, religion, indigeneity
and partisan politics. Disputes in urban areas have had
direct impact on rural areas, the most important point
of connection being replication in rural areas of the
political, economic and religious sentiments and dis-
courses that accumulate in cities during times of con-
flict (Higazi 2013; HRW 2001). In December 2010, for
example, several churches were bombed in Jos during
midnight mass and widespread riots followed with vio-
lence quickly spreading to rural areas on the Plateau. Most
of this violence was directed against Muslims - Hausa and
Kanuri residents in historic tin mining settlements and ad-
jacent Fulani agro-pastoralist communities (Higazi 2011).
Similarly, conflicts between herders and farmers in rural
communities have escalated into widespread violence af-
fecting urban areas (Roma 2008; Blench 2003; Higazi
2013; Moritz 2010). A minor incident at a rural abattoir
(attack on a Christian butcher by a Muslim cus-
tomer) resulted in rural-urban escalation of violence
throughout Bauchi State, including the state capital
in 1991 (Falola 1998).
Such conflicts have been compounded by the fact that
Fulani have little or no land rights or rights of inherit-
ance to pasture, water or cattle tracks in the country,
meaning that the struggle for access to these resources
underpins the increasingly strained relationships with
the local indigene community.
The development of grazing reserves
Grazing reserves emerged as a policy tool for modernisa-
tion of the livestock sector in Nigeria in the 1960s. The
major aim was to provide pastoralists with more secure
land tenure to encourage movement away from tradi-
tional transhumant cattle-rearing practices and reduce
the clashes between pastoralists and crop farmers.
The Grazing Reserve Act of 1965 was passed by the
Ahmadu Bello administration of the Northern Region(Waters-Bayer and Taylor-Powell 1986a; Awogbade 1987;
Ingawa et al. 1989). In the third National Development
Plan (1975 to 1980), the federal and state governments
made a 120 million Naira (equivalent to USD$ 200 million
at the time) investment in livestock development, of which
70% was allocated to grazing reserves. The management
of this investment was overseen by the National Livestock
Project Unit (NLPU), part of the Federal Livestock
Department, which today is called the National Livestock
Project Department (NLPD) (Ingawa et al. 1989). The
NLPD was responsible for provision of general infrastruc-
ture including boreholes, dams, schools and roads. The
formal gazetting of the KGR did not occur until 1996. The
delay in gazetting the KGR together with lack of legalised
land ownership and slow government investment in in-
frastructure dissuaded pastoralists from settling in the
reserve (Waters-Bayer and Taylor-Powell 1986a). The
failure of successive governments to promote the bene-
fits of the grazing reserves and the persisting Fulani
traditional dependency on transhumant practice also
contributed to the initial reluctance of pastoralists to
settle in the reserve.
The selection and acquisition of grazing lands is the
responsibility of individual state governments, and the
high levels of land compensation recommended by the
Federal Land Use Act of 1978 (now Chapter L5, Laws of
the Federation of Nigeria, 2004) dissuaded many states
from setting up grazing reserves (Waters-Bayer and
Taylor-Powell 1986a). At the start of the Second National
Development Plan in 1970 to 1980, the grazing reserve
concept became a national development strategy for cattle
production and was reflected as the major pastoral devel-
opment strategy in the Second, Third (1975 to 1980) and
Fourth National Development Plans (1980 to 1985), as
well as the First (1976 to 1983) and Second Livestock
Development Programme FLDP (1976 to 1983) and
SLDP (1987 to 1995). For example, the Third National
Development Plan (1975 to 1980) proposed the estab-
lishment of a total of 22 million hectares in grazing re-
serves. By the end of 1977, (only) 2 million hectares
had been acquired by both the state and federal govern-
ments (Gefu et al. 1988).
Officially, Nigeria now has 415 grazing reserves, but
only one third are in use as the remainder have not been
gazetted (IRIN 2009).
Study area
The study was undertaken in the Kachia Grazing Reserve
(KGR) in Kaduna State, northwest Nigeria, known as
Ladduga (‘large bush’ or ‘wilderness’) by its Fulani inhabi-
tants. The reserve lies between the urban centres of
Kaduna and Zaria to the northwest, Jos to the southeast
and Abuja to the southwest. The reserve, a total area of
approximately 334 km2, lies within the sub-humid zone of
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Woodland vegetation with an annual rainfall of 1000
to 1200 mm and an average temperature of 28 °C
(Aregheore 2009). The wet season lasts between May/
June and October while the dry season lasts from
November to May/June.
The KGR was established to encourage sedenterisation
of Fulani, aiming to improve livestock production and
the standard of living of pastoralists, to promote access
to social amenities and reduce farmer/pastoralist conflict
(Waters-Bayer and Taylor-Powell 1986a, Gadoh 2011).
While the KGR reserve was ‘established’ by the Ministry
of Animal and Forest Resources of the then North Central
State (now Kaduna State) in 1968, developmental work
did not begin until late 1970, when the Ministry of
Agriculture mapped strategies for water and pasture de-
velopment (Gadoh 2011). The KGR was re-officialised in
1988, after developmental work was carried out as part of
a World Bank and State Government Intervention. The
Kachia Grazing Reserve order was passed in 1996 and
the land officially gazetted in 1996 (Kaduna State of
Nigeria 1996).
At inception, the KGR was fumigated to eliminate the
risks posed to cattle by tsetse-transmitted African animal
trypanosomiasis (AAT) and was subsequently declared
‘tsetse free’ (Waters-Bayer and Taylor-Powell 1986a).
The foundational infrastructure in the KGR included an
administrative headquarters, roads, dams, bore wells,
cattle dips, credit schemes, veterinary services and ex-
perimentation with various methods of pasture improve-
ment as well as a smallholder dairy scheme supplying
supplementary cattle feed on credit. The KGR served as
a base for research into livestock production and disease
control.
Any person wishing to settle in the KGR had to obtain
a permit from the Project Officer which specified the
number and type of animals permitted in the reserve,
where they could graze, the size of the area allocated for
grazing and a photograph of the permit holder (Kaduna
State of Nigeria 1996). Each household settling in the
KGR was allocated 10 ha: 4 for crop farming, 3 for fod-
der banks/feedlots and 3 for living quarters and livestock
enclosures (Kaduna State of Nigeria 1996).
The KGR was initially well-staffed with 24 permanent
employees including a range management officer and his
assistant, four grazing control assistants, a veterinary as-
sistant, a typist, a driver, three plant operators, five per-
manent and five casual labourers and two watchmen
(Oxby 1984). Newer facilities include a secondary school,
nine primary schools, a livestock-training centre, a com-
munity health clinic and a private health clinic.
The KGR is now mostly self-administered, with au-
thority vested in the District Head and his council of el-
ders (Okello et al. 2014). Many of the original facilitiesnow have broken down, and one project officer remains
on staff to handle administration, supervise the general
activities of the reserve and provide monthly reports to
the State Ministry of Agriculture. The Project Officer is
also responsible for undertaking an annual census. Pro-
cedures to regulate and monitor the influx of people and
their animals into the KGR have largely been abandoned
due to a lack of human resources. Incoming families are
reluctant to seek out the Project Officer as a fee is
payable for a settlement permit that must be renewed
annually. Instead, they seek approval from the District
Head and farm as much land as they want, limited only
by labour availability (Ducrotoy et al. 2017).
KGR settlers are exclusively Fulani pastoralists. The
KGR is subdivided into six administrative blocks, which
show slight variation in ecological and demographic
characteristics (Ducrotoy et al. 2017) (Figure 1). The
commercial hub of the KGR is referred to as Tampol,
which was coined from the word ‘tarpaulin’. A tarpaulin
was used to erect the initial temporary structures when
the grazing reserve was first established. Tampol con-
tains numerous shops (tea shops, butchers, etc.), and
every Friday, as part of the special occasion of the Salah
al jama’ah or Friday prayers, traders from the surrounding
area come in and set additional stalls for business.
Methods
This study complements a larger mixed methods study
on zoonotic disease and pastoral livelihoods in KGR
(Ducrotoy 2015, Ducrotoy et al. 2016 and Ducrotoy
et al. 2017). Several rounds of data collection were
undertaken as part of this study, including a complete
household census in 2011, focus group discussions
(FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIs) undertaken
from March to October 2011.
The census by the project team was facilitated by local
participants: the Project Officer (state representative),
who had 10 years of experience of working in the KGR,
and a KGR community member to guide the census
team through the difficult terrain, as the KGR is essen-
tially a woodland area. Householders return to the KGR
at the onset of the rains in June; hence, the census took
place when all community members were present in the
KGR, even if they practise dry season transhumance.
All 777 households in the reserve were geo-referenced
by Global Positioning System (GPS) (Garmin Geko™),
and data on household origin, year of settlement in the
KGR, household and herd size and management were
collected. Data on year of settlement in the KGR were
used as a proxy for the number of households moving
into the KGR over time. Motivation for settling in the
KGR was verified directly with the respondents of new
immigrant households during the census as well as
during FGDs and KIIs.
Figure 1 Geographical location of new immigrant (yellow) and established resident (red) households in June 2011
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visit the ardo or village head of each village. The ardo
then escorted the census team to every household in his
village, promoting participation and ensuring a low non-
response rate (only 25 households refused to answer
questions, see Table 1). The jewuro or household head
was the respondent of choice, followed by the next most
senior male member of the household, as men have the
most accurate knowledge of livestock numbers. House-
holds were defined as ruga, consisting of a man, his wife
or wives, unmarried children and dependents, as this
was the unit of interest for the government. In this
study, the term household corresponds to a ruga, as dis-
tinct from a wuro, which refers to the extended house-
hold or multiple ruga (Ducrotoy et al. 2017).
Qualitative data were collected during FGDs and KIIs.
The FGDs were conducted with ardos from all blocks
to discuss immigration patterns into the KGR over
time and explore differences between the blocks in
terms of household and topographical characteristics.
KIIs, broadly discussing past and future trends in the
KGR, were undertaken with elderly, educated and elite
male members of the community and young pastoralists.
Topics explored during the FGD and KIIs included major
events impacting on the KGR community in the last
40 years. Immigration into the KGR was discussed,
including the motivations for pastoralists leaving their
place of origin to settle in the KGR (push and pull factors
of re-settlement). New immigrants, defined as households
that moved to the KGR in 2011, were examined as a
separate group to explore factors influencing immigration
and differences to previously established residents of the
reserve.
KGR residents are bilingual, speaking and under-
standing both Fulfulde and Hausa. Our interpreter
spoke only Hausa, so focus group discussions were
done in Hausa, the second language of KGR residents.
Fulani terms for important words were recorded. Key
informant interviews were undertaken in Hausa or
directly in English when possible.
All census data were entered in Microsoft Excel®. Data
were examined for inconsistencies or anomalies andTable 1 New immigrants and previously established residents
in 2011
No. established
residents
No. new
immigrants
Total
population
% increase
Households 503 249 752a 49.5
People 6142 2939 9081 47.9
Cattle 23,167 18,047 41,214 77.9
Sheep 5234 4921 10,155 94.0
Goats 3401 1427 4828 42.0
aOverall number of households was 777, but 25 households refused to provide
information on year of settlement or number of people and livestockcleaned to remove outliers and entry errors and checked
for missing fields, and common answers entered with
different spellings were checked. Completeness and pre-
cision checks were undertaken by cross-checking hand-
written form data with Excel spread sheet data.
Qualitative data from FGDs and KIIs were analysed
based on coding textual data into selected themes and
sub-themes.
Data presented are census data; hence, significance
tests or calculation of confidence intervals are redun-
dant. Data were analysed using descriptive statistics and
presented in tables, bar charts and line charts. The data
is context- and time-specific, providing evidence of
drivers and outcomes of Fulani immigration and integra-
tion before 2012.
Results
Demographics
The June 2011 census showed the KGR to be inhabited
by 777 households. Individual household demographic
data (available for 752 households) indicated a human,
cattle, sheep and goat population of approximately
10,000, 40,000, 10,000 and 5,000 respectively. The aver-
age number of people, cattle, sheep and goat per house-
hold was 12, 55, 14 and 6 respectively (Table 1).
New immigration in 2011
In total, 249 new households moved into the KGR in
2011. The number of households, people and goats in
the KGR increased by almost 50%, while cattle numbers
increased by 75% and sheep numbers almost doubled
(Table 1). All new immigrants were Fulani pastoralists.
The resulting 2011 population of humans and sheep
within the KGR comprised approximately one third of
new immigrants, who also accounted for almost half of
the cattle and goat population as shown in Figure 2.
Most of the new immigrants were internally displaced
persons who arrived in April and May 2011 following
post-election violence in Kaduna city and a spate ofFigure 2 KGR populations in 2011 showing proportion of new
immigrants
Figure 3 Temporary housing erected by families during the mass
immigration event of April to May 2011
Figure 5 Number of households immigrating to the KGR 1978 to 2011
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ern Kaduna State. Many immigrants had been burnt out
of their homes and arrived with very few possessions other
than their cattle and sheep. New immigrants settled
throughout the blocks comprising the KGR (Figure 1)
erecting temporary lodgings (Figure 3). Both the Red
Cross and Nigeria’s National Emergency Management
Agency (NEMA) provided relief materials and set up
temporary infrastructure, for example, additional school
classrooms (Figure 4).
Immigration since 1978
Mean immigration levels have risen steadily in the KGR
from 6.4 households per year in the 1980s to 14.9 per
year in the 1990s and 26.6 in the 2000s. In 2010, 52
households immigrated into the KGR followed by the
249 in 2011. In addition, there have been fluctuations in
immigration levels, showing higher and lower periods ofFigure 4 Temporary classrooms set up by the Nigerian Red Cross to
cater for the refugee crisis in the KGRimmigration (Figure 5). Peak immigration periods were
1990 to 1993, 1999 to 2003, 2008 to 2009 and 2010 to
2011 (Figure 6).
Periods of high immigration are associated with the in-
cidence of violent conflicts in northwest and north-
central Nigeria (Table 2). Push-pull factors responsible
for the episodic rise in immigration into the KGR in the
periods reflected in Figures 5 and 6 are discussed in the
‘Drivers of migration’ section.
Most households that have settled in the KGR have
come from a 400-km radius around the KGR, the neigh-
bouring Bauchi State in the east, Plateau State in the
southwest, Nassarawa State in the south and Niger
State in the west. Others have migrated from Kano and
Katsina States in the north (Figure 7).
Family, flock and herd sizes per household
New immigrants had more cattle and sheep but fewer
goats and slightly smaller families than established resi-
dents (Table 3).
Emigration out of the KGR
Examination of grazing licences (available until the 1990s)
and interviews with first settlers confirmed that mostFigure 6 High and low periods of immigration
Table 2 Proportion of immigrants from conflict areas during peak periods of immigration (IRBC 1993; Osaghae and Suberu 2005;
Falola 1998; HRW 2003, 2001; IFRC 2011; Higazi 2013)
Period Conflict Location Year % immigrants from
conflict area
1990 to 1993 Religious violence in Katsina by Shi’ite sect
of Yahaya Yakubu
Katsina 1991 78
Ethno-religious violence over abattoir use
and revenue control in Bauchi
Bauchi 1991
Intra-Islamic religious violence stirred up by
Izala sect in Kano
Kano 1991
Zangon-Kataf riots over market location and
revenue control
Southern Kaduna 1992
1999 to 2003 Ethno-religious clashes between Hausa-Fulani
and southern Kaduna indigenes
Southern Kaduna 1999 64
Protests against the introduction of Sharia Kaduna 2000, 2001
Protests against ‘Miss World’ contest and
related ‘blasphemous’ newspaper article
Kaduna, Abuja, Lagos 2002
Natural resource conflict, political and
ethno-religious crisis between Hausa-Fulani
‘settlers’ and Plateau indigenes
Plateau 2001
2007 to 2011 Natural resource conflict, political and
ethno-religious crisis between Hausa-Fulani
‘settlers’ and Plateau Indigenes
Plateau 2008, 2010, 2011 78
Election crisis of 2011 across Northern Nigeria Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe,
Niger and Bornu
2011
At least 10 isolated ethno-religious clashes
across six local governments
Southern Kaduna 2011
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An elderly ardo from Block 1, whose household moved
into the KGR in 1978, stated that his block had only seen
two households out of 131 (1.5%) move out of the KGR in
his lifetime. FGDs corroborated the finding that house-
holds rarely left once they had settled in the KGR.Figure 7 Map showing areas from which households have migratedDiscussion
Household and herd sizes
New immigrants possessed larger livestock holdings
than the established agro-pastoralist KGR residents
who had invested some of their assets in land and other
cropping-related activities. This was supported from
the FGD and KII, which indicated that many immigrant
families brought with them cattle herds that were much
larger than those generally kept by established resi-
dents. Established residents purported to keep smaller
herds as a consequence of the limited carrying cap-
acity and grazing resources in the KGR. Owners of lar-
ger herds routinely split these into multiple sub-herds,
some of which are kept by relatives on holdings out-
side of the KGR (Ducrotoy et al. 2016; Ducrotoy et al.
2017). The ratio of sheep to goats maintained alsoTable 3 Mean human and animal population at level of
household
Mean number per household Established residents New immigrants
Family size 12.3 11.9
Cattle 46.4 72.9
Sheep 10.5 19.9
Goats 6.8 5.8
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nomadic life, while goats are more important to set-
tled agro-pastoralists as they cannot be herded along
with cattle.
This study supports the findings by Jabbar et al. (1995)
who explored changes associated with sedentarisation
and showed that recently settled pastoralists had con-
siderably larger herds than long-term settlers. Herd size
decreased gradually up to 10 years of settlement
whereby it dropped sharply as households diversified
their livelihoods by investing in cultivation, trade and
paid employment (Jabbar et al. 1995; Azuwike and
Enwerem 2010; Adunga 2013).
The observed differences in livestock numbers are also
linked to access to natural resources. Sedentarisation is a
trade-off between high-risk, high-opportunity livestock-
reliant pastoralism and the lower risk, lower but more
diverse opportunities of agro-pastoralism. More mobile
pastoralists have greater access to natural resources and
can relocate to where resources are most abundant,
exploiting them more exhaustively. However, having no
rights to land or natural resources, they are entirely
dependent on the goodwill of their ‘host’ communities.
Settled agro-pastoralists are limited by the resources
available within their community which they must use
responsibly and sustainably with their neighbours. They
have the opportunity to acquire land and access rights to
natural resources and to integrate with the host commu-
nities. Prevailing circumstances determine which way
the balance shifts, with increasing pressure on natural
resources currently favouring settlement and agro-
pastoralism.Drivers of migration
The census data indicated four main periods of immi-
gration into the KGR, the numbers increasing with time.
During the first peak of immigration (1990 to 1993), 96
households entered the reserve. Between 1999 and 2003,
105 households moved to the KGR. In 2007 to 2010, 173
households moved into the reserve, and 2011 saw a large
immigration of 249 households.
This study does not capture quantitative or qualitative
data on households that might have left the reserve. The
sample is therefore biased towards pastoralists who have
stayed in the KGR. This bias is minimal, however, as
emigration was confirmed to be a rare event.
Examination of grazing licences (available until the
1990s) revealed no record of anyone moving out, and
key informant resident interviews with first settlers con-
firmed that most immigrant households relocated per-
manently to the KGR. This is common, since, once
settled, pastoralists are reluctant to move (Gefu 1992).
FGDs emphasised that once people move into the KGR,they very rarely move out, because, as one man stated:
‘we are at peace here’.
When asked why people moved to KGR, the unani-
mous answer was ‘to get away from conflict in other
areas’. The KGR is seen as a safe haven, a legitimate area
of land set aside for Fulani by the government, overcoming
the land rights issues that confronted Fulani when living
among hosting communities.
The conflicts the Fulani were seeking to avoid were of
two types as reflected in the nature of the immigration.
The first is a steady slow trickle of newcomers, gradually
rising over the years. These are Fulani who are avoiding,
mostly, non-violent natural resource conflicts and ten-
sions arising from population increase and land pressure
as well as antagonistic practices like the denial of herder
access to land and water and the closure of cattle tracks
and pastures by farmers. These restrictions convey the
impression to the pastoralists that they are an unwanted
nuisance (Majekodunmi et al. 2013). The second is sud-
den and massive immigration into the KGR by internally
displaced people who fled from areas of violent conflicts
and insecurity, often following personal experience of
violence directed at and/or perpetrated by other Fulani.
These conflicts are rooted in competition and conflict
over resources in both rural and urban areas but have
strong political, ethnic and religious overtones. The peak
immigration periods into the KGR coincided with not-
able periods of violence in northern Nigeria between
1990 and 2011.
The drivers for settlement in 1990 to 1993, 1999 to
2003 and 2007 to 2010 were confirmed during focus
group discussions with community members, and the
dates of peak immigration coincided with notable pe-
riods of rioting in northern Nigeria between 1990 and
2010 (Table 2). The first period of immigration in 1990
to 1993 was marked by the violence in Zangon-Kataf in
1992. Riots in Bauchi State were triggered by a minor
incident at a small-town abattoir close to the state cap-
ital. The incident is estimated to have killed and injured
numerous people and displaced 5,000 (Falola 1998). In
May 1992, violence erupted in Zangon-Kataf as a result
of a Muslim/Hausa versus Christian/Kataf conflict.
Seventy-eight percent of the immigrants during this
period came from the locations of these conflicts
(Table 2), mostly from Kafanchan, Zangon-Kataf and
Zonkwa in southern Kaduna (54%).
The early 2000s were marked by three major crises:
the 2000 crisis of Kaduna, the Jos riots of 2001 and the
2002 Kaduna ‘Miss World Riots’. Fighting between
Muslims and Christians in Kaduna in February to March
2000 followed a debate around the proposed introduc-
tion of Sharia Law in Kaduna State and resulted in the
death of 2,000 people. The first Jos riot occurred in 2001
over the appointment of a Muslim politician and
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infrastructure and homes and the displacement of be-
tween 50,000 and 200,000 civilians (HRW 2001). A fur-
ther 250 people were killed in November 2002 when
protests relating to the Miss World beauty contest due
to be held in Nigeria degenerated into riots and wide-
spread violence (HRW 2003). In 2008, a riot broke out
in Jos over local elections and mounting tension between
Muslim and Christian gangs left 300 persons dead and
10,000 displaced (Higazi 2013).
Sixty-four percent of households immigrating between
1999 and 2003 reported moving from Kaduna State
(mostly Zangon-Kataf) and 19% from Plateau State (mostly
Ganawuri). These numbers show that immigration into the
KGR was predominantly due to the Jos and Kaduna crises,
which started in urban centres and later spilled over into
rural areas (Higazi 2013).
The majority of households (78%) that moved into the
KGR between 2007 and 2010 came from conflict areas -
71% from surrounding southern Kaduna (mostly Zangon-
Kataf (14%), Kauru (12%), Saminaka (8%), Kachia (8%),
Kafanchan (7%)) and 7% from Plateau State. Violence and
tensions in these areas was again confirmed to push
people out of these areas during FGDs.
The post-election violence that erupted in April to May
2011 in the nearby areas of Zangon-Kataf, Kafanchana
and Boto (southern Kaduna State) was the main driver for
immigration into the KGR in 2011. The crisis in 2011 was
marked by civil unrest and violent protests in the northern
states of Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe, Niger and Borno,
before and after the presidential election in April 2011.
The Nigerian Red Cross estimate that 75,000 people were
displaced, 542 injured and 288 were killed during this
period and that property worth hundreds of thousands of
USD$ had been destroyed (IFRC 2011). Fulani herdsmen
were singled out in the press as being responsible for
some incidents - such accusations were not proven but
fuelled unease and fear among the Fulani. Fulani settle-
ments across southern Kaduna State were attacked and
burnt, and survivors fled to the KGR (IFRC 2011). This
is another example of urban violence in Kaduna city
spreading to rural areas.
Northwest and north-central Nigeria is steeped in a
long history of domination by the Muslim, Hausa-
Fulani minority and suppression of the indigenous
Christian majority during pre-colonial, colonial and
post-independence regimes, which were all centralised
governments. There have always been tensions in this
area, with deep-seated resentment and contempt on
both sides and sporadic outbreaks of violence over the
years. The current dispensation of democratic, repre-
sentative rule has seen the balance shift and majority
groups assert themselves, leading to intense competi-
tion for authority and resources. It has been widelydocumented by reliable, impartial observers that both
sides bear responsibility for inciting and perpetuating
these clashes, along with the authorities (federal and
state governments, police, military, traditional and reli-
gious leaders) whose interventions have often been slow,
inappropriate and ineffectual (Nigeria Watch 2014; HRW
2005, 2011; Bocquier and Maupeu 2005; Kwaja 2011;
IDMC 2012; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2010;
NWGAV and AOAV 2015; International Crisis Group
2012). Use of extreme force, extra-judicial killings and
biases towards one side or the other have been the feature
of police and military intervention in conflict situations
(HRW 2002, 2010, 2013; Alemika 2013; Odinkalu 2008;
NWGAV and AOAV 2015).
Consequences of high immigration in the KGR
There is high population and grazing pressure in the
KGR due to the increasing levels of immigration. Dry
season cattle density was estimated at 10 head/km2 in
KGR and 18 head/km2 and the wider sub-humid zone in
the 1980s (Waters-Bayer and Taylor-Powell 1986a). The
2011 census shows a density of 123 head/km2 (41,214
cattle/334 km2). If one considers the original guidelines
of allocating 10 ha per family (4 ha for crop farming, 3
for fodder banks/feedlots and 3 for living quarters and
livestock enclosures) and the fact that only approxi-
mately 25% of the reserve is exploitable for growing
crops and grazing cattle due to the rest being covered by
thick forest (estimate from FGDs and KII with Project
Officer), the 777 households present in 2011 were close
to the maximum carrying capacity of 835 families.
The KGR is located on land with poor soil and pasture
quality (Mohamed-Saleem 1986). The rise in cattle num-
bers from successive waves of immigrants arriving with
larger and larger herds is not sustainable. The indigen-
ous communities displaced by the creation of the reserve
cooperated in releasing the land in the first place be-
cause it had the poorest soil (Oxby 1984). A scheme for
pasture improvement and establishment of fodder banks
initiated by the International Livestock Centre for Africa
(ILCA) in the 1980s was not popular, never enforced
and is now past recall by KGR inhabitants. Many house-
holds view extensive farming for home consumption and
sale as the best use of land in the KGR. A mean of
5.2 ha is cultivated per household and one household
farmed 50 ha (Ducrotoy et al. 2017). Inhabitants have
significant investment in their cropping activities and
make frequent use of hired labour and animal traction.
Competition between cultivation and pasture within the
reserve exacerbates pressure on grazing, replicating
some of the natural resource conflict issues faced out-
side the reserve.
The fact that the KGR cannot support the cattle popu-
lation within its boundaries forces pastoralists to
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In June 2011, 69% of households practised seasonal trans-
humance to source adequate pasture for their cattle. Of
these, 31% practised dry season transhumance and 13%
wet season transhumance and 26% practised both wet and
dry season transhumance. By October 2011, 90% of
households reported having taken their cattle on dry and/
or wet season transhumance during the previous
12 months from grazing pressures caused by the influx of
refugees in June 2011 (Ducrotoy et al. 2016).
Dry season transhumance is a long-established prac-
tice of pastoral life. However, wet season transhumance
is a more recent development both in the KGR and in
Nigeria more generally and a direct response to re-
duction in grazing caused by land pressure. A recent
study in 30 villages in Jos revealed that 73% of
herders practised transhumance with over half prac-
ticing both wet and dry season migration. The major
driver of wet season migration was limited availability
of resources and attendant restricted access to them
(Majekodunmi et al. 2014).
Transhumance data from pastoralists living in the
KGR (Ducrotoy et al. 2016) and Jos Plateau (Majeko-
dunmi et al. 2014) offer an insight into the nuances of
land pressure and pasture quality as drivers for migra-
tion, especially during the wet season, in and outside of
a grazing reserve. Most households in the KGR inter-
viewed in June 2011 (83%) described poor quality of
grass, scarcity of water and animals running out of pas-
ture (overgrazing) as the main push factors for transhu-
mance. A minority (12%) linked migrating to tsetse fly
challenge. Only 5% reported undertaking transhumance
because ‘it is a custom or tradition’ or ‘attachment to the
thrill of grazing in a new environment’.
In Jos, the inability of Fulani to control natural re-
sources and poor access to these, especially during the
wet season, highlighted social factors as drivers of migra-
tion. Lack of water and grass was a motivator for trans-
humance in only 54% of villages. Lack of access to
resources was sub-categorised into lack of access to land
(35%), bush burning (9%) and conflict with farmers (2%).
Pastoralists in the KGR have access to pasture and
water, but soil and pasture quality is poor, driving dry
season transhumance: ‘Usually everyone who went on
dry season migration brings their cattle back to the KGR
as soon as they have word that the rains have come to
KGR’ (FGD discussant). The arrival of the new immi-
grants caused a shift in this paradigm. Mass influx of
people and cattle on a restricted and already saturated
land resulted in animals running short of pasture (over-
grazing). ‘In previous times, when there were less people
in KGR, the grass had time to recover during the wet
season, but now the good grass is being replaced by dust
or weeds which the cattle cannot eat’ (KII, village head).Social factors were also at play as new immigrants were
used to better conditions and had larger herds and were
therefore willing to move even during the wet season. This
statement from a KGR focus group discussant illustrated the
main reason given for wet season transhumance: ‘when new-
comers came they discovered that KGR has limited grasses,
and they were more motivated to go on transhumance be-
cause they have come from areas which had a lot of grass’.
In the KGR, transhumance practice was mostly deter-
mined by herd size. Herds with less than 50 animals
could be sustained within the KGR, but a sub-group of
cattle from larger herds had to leave the KGR to find sup-
plementary grazing. Duration of settlement influenced
when and how far households moved their cattle. Dry sea-
son transhumance practice was equally undertaken among
new and old inhabitants, but wet season transhumance
was practised mostly by recent settlers and new immi-
grants, who also travelled farther from the KGR when on
transhumance (Ducrotoy et al. 2016). ‘Most of those that
go far away are new settlers or newcomers that have come
in the last two years, those of us that have settled here for
a long time do not go far’.
New arrivals had recently come from areas of more
abundant, higher quality pasture and were more moti-
vated to travel in search of better grazing. Long-term
residents are used to the conditions in and around the
KGR and are content with available resources. FGDs
also revealed the community welcomed the new immi-
grants ‘with open arms’, as ‘they are our kin’ (FGD par-
ticipant), but during the course of the study, there were
signs of mounting tension over competition for the
shrinking pasture. Poorly managed and too few grazing
reserves as well as shrinking resources tend to fuel com-
petition among KGR pastoralists.
The fact that a significant proportion of KGR residents
had been personally affected by violence and lost prop-
erty and family profoundly affected their perception of
new immigrants. Researchers recall a woman exhibiting
profound distress when asked if her husband, the jewuro,
could give information about her household; he had re-
cently been killed in the post-election clashes of April
2011. The world outside the reserve is generally viewed
with deep suspicion and a strong sense of persecution.
The zoonotic disease survey was almost derailed because
the field manager was from Plateau State and several
KGR residents had fled the Plateau during the 2001 cri-
sis (Ducrotoy et al. 2015). All work was put on hold for
three months and it took the intervention of a senior
civil servant, a Fulani, to get community leaders’ ap-
proval for work to continue. This shows that although
grazing reserves improve the lot of pastoral people and
solve many natural resource use issues, they can foster
stereotypes, suspicion and ignorance of ‘outsiders’
(Ducrotoy et al. 2015).
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pastoralists in Nigeria today (Okeke 2014). The inci-
dence of violent farmer-herder clashes has reached in-
tolerable levels and is an issue of national concern. In
2012, the Fulani appealed to the federal government and
a grazing reserve (National Assembly 2011) was pro-
posed to appropriate land for grazing in all 36 states of
the federation. This was met by furious opposition
across Nigeria, but with particularly strong opposition
from the Middle belt. The main arguments were that
other Nigerian citizens can only acquire land by inherit-
ance or purchase and pay for premises and inputs to run
their businesses, and there was reluctance for Fulani to
be given these assets for free. The question was raised
‘why should government appropriate land from other
Nigerians to support Fulani livelihoods?’, and the feeling
was that they should lease or purchase land for pasture
and that the government could support them by over-
seeing such negotiations (Okeke 2014). This bill and two
others (one duplicating and the other in direct oppos-
ition to it) were withdrawn by the senate in 2016 as they
were judged unconstitutional. Instead, the House of
Assembly committee recommended reclamation and de-
velopment of all current grazing reserves under the 1965
Grazing Reserve Act (albeit that most were recognised
as being severely encroached), clear demarcation and en-
forcement of cattle routes and support for cattle produc-
tion within these protected areas. These recommendations
are being implemented by some state governments with
successful reduction of clashes (Okello et al. 2014).
Conclusions
This study has shown how violent and non-violent conflict
is the main driver for immigration into the KGR. Increasing
insecurity in northwest Nigeria and corresponding high im-
migration levels have led to population pressures within the
reserve.
Since the governance of the KGR is now mostly by
customary authorities (Okello et al. 2014), the residents
of the grazing reserve have shifted land use from pure
grazing to a mixed-use area comprising grazing, cultiva-
tion, internally displaced persons camp and resettlement
zone.
Settlement in grazing reserves does not prevent trans-
humance practice. Pastoralists settle and become agro-
pastoralists, but transhumance persists and may even
increase. From an ecological point of view, transhu-
mance is a highly effective and appropriate way to use
grazing resources that vary in space and time. In Nigeria
today, given the insecurity and politicisation of herder-
farmer conflicts, it can also have economic and social
disadvantages. Whole families no longer move together as
a unit, as only young men go on transhumance, impacting
on family and social life. Tension and insecurity meanstranshumant herders and cattle are at risk from cattle rus-
tlers and from clashes with farmers. Herd splitting and
long periods of transhumance mean less milk for home
consumption and reduced income for pastoralist women.
The costs sometimes overtake the benefits, for example,
54% of production costs for Jos Fulani went into paying
experienced hired herders to protect cattle on transhu-
mance (Majekodunmi et al. 2014).
Mobility has increased as more households are forced
into transhumance for longer periods. It is the interplay
between availability and access to pastoral resources
which drives transhumance. Wet season transhumance
in the KGR peaked with the arrival of new immigrants
due to ensuing competition for grazeable land.
Although steps are being taken to address these
conflicts, security will not be restored overnight and
immigration to the KGR will continue to rise. Stra-
tegic sustainable intervention is required both within
and outside the KGR to ease land pressure and se-
cure rural livelihoods. Pastoralists themselves are
already working on solving these problems, by going
on transhumance and distributing the grazing pres-
sures over the available resources. But this coping
mechanism is unsustainable and also part of what
causes the insecurity, by increasing opportunities for
farmer-herder clashes.
The pervasive natural resource conflict issues must
be addressed. The House of Assembly committee rec-
ommendations with regard to the reclamation and de-
velopment of grazing reserves under the 1965 Grazing
Reserve Act and clear demarcation and enforcement of
cattle routes represent efforts to balance the inequality
in land tenure administration and will be important in
reducing conflict. Pastoral self-governance networks are
known to successfully regulate grazing habits (Okello
et al. 2014). These networks will be very helpful in pro-
moting pasture development.
Investment in and enforcement of pasture development
is key, and activities such as water and soil conservation
and improvement and planting fodder/browse species
must be prioritised by both government and pastoral au-
thorities. In the complex landscape of farmer-herder con-
flicts, transhumance is one of the root causes of
insecurity. Pasture development and provision of transhu-
mance corridors could impact on insecurity by reducing
or re-channelling transhumance to demarcated zones.
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